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INTRODUCTION
Fans of Major League Baseball (“MLB” or “Baseball”) have
long voiced their displeasure with the league’s broadcast
restrictions and blackout rules.1 However, despite MLB
Commissioner Bud Selig’s candid recognition of the harm
caused by television viewership restrictions, the league has
failed to take significant steps to remedy the problem.2
Consequently, in May 2012, baseball fans filed an antitrust
lawsuit against MLB, several individual MLB clubs, and the
regional sports networks (“RSNs”) and multivideo
programming distributors (“MVPDs”) responsible for
producing and distributing broadcasts of MLB games on
television.3 The crux of the complaint is that Baseball’s
broadcasting plan is implemented through illegal horizontal
agreements that protect clubs against competition for
television viewership in their home territories.4
In Laumann v. National Hockey League,5 Judge Shira
Scheindlin of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York denied the defendants’ motion
to dismiss, holding that the complaint adequately stated a
claim for harm to competition in the market for broadcasts of
1. See Jeff Wolf, Decades-old blackout rules leave Major League Baseball fans in
the dark, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL (April 24, 2011, 9:01 AM),
http://www.lvrj.com/sports/decades-old-blackout-rules-leave-major-league-baseball-fansin-the-dark-120563299.html; Jeff Passan, MLB’s blackout problem keeps sport in dark
ages, YAHOO! SPORTS (June 22, 2012, 10:06 AM), http://sports.yahoo.com/
news/mlb%E2%80%99s-blackout-problem-keeps-sport-in-dark-ages.html (“In areas
where it makes no sense to carry a particular RSN, the fans are out of luck even if they
buy the Extra Innings or MLB.tv packages.”); Jeremy Lacks, End of the Dark Ages?
Lawsuits Put Sports TV Blackout Rules to the Test, JD SUPRA (Jan. 1, 2013),
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/end-of-the-dark-ages-lawsuits-put-spor81591/#Article5 (“Contemporary fans have long been frustrated by the current
arrangement.”).
2. Jeff Passan, Selig’s promise, YAHOO! SPORTS (July 11, 2006),
http://sports.yahoo.com/mlb/news?slug=jp-blackouts071106.
3. As discussed infra Part I, MVPDs are television providers that offer
programming to subscribers for a fee. MVPD platforms included cable operators such
as Comcast and Time Warner Cable, national satellite providers such as DirecTV and
Dish Network, and large telephone companies such as VerizonFiOS or AT&T. See
Video Competition, NAT’L CABLE & TELECOMM. ASS’N, http://www.ncta.com/
IssueBriefs/VideoCompetition.aspx (last visited Oct. 29, 2012).
4. See Class Action Complaint, Garber v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, No. 12
CIV 3704, 2012 WL 1609215 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2012).
5. The suit against MLB was consolidated with a similar complaint against the
National Hockey League. See Action Complaint, Laumann v. National Hockey League,
No. 12-1817(KMW), 2012 WL 3019470 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2012).
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live baseball games.6 The decision was somewhat surprising
given that a previous challenge to a very similar broadcasting
arrangement used by the National Basketball Association
(“NBA”) failed to make it past summary judgment. In
Kingray, Inc. v. National Basketball Ass’n, Judge M. James
Lorenz of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of California held that a complaint alleging that the
NBA and DirecTV conspired to raise prices by blacking out
basketball games failed to state a claim for anticompetitive
harm.7 While the holding in Laumann is undoubtedly a
preliminary win for baseball fans aggrieved by the league’s
blackout policy, the legality of MLB’s model ultimately
depends on whether the league can show that the harm
caused by viewership restrictions is justified for other
procompetitive reasons.
This Comment compares the holdings in Laumann and
Kingray and provides insight into the findings a court would
need to make in order to hold that MLB’s broadcasting plan
violates antitrust law. Part I describes the structure of the
sports television programming market and Baseball’s
broadcasting model, which implements blackouts through a
combination of horizontal agreements among clubs and
vertical agreements between clubs, RSNS, and MVPDs.
Critics argue that this model is susceptible to antitrust attack
because it reduces competition between teams and results in
higher prices for consumers.8 Part II provides a synopsis of
relevant antitrust law, focusing on the three analytical tests
courts apply to evaluate the reasonableness of restraints on
trade. Examining the circumstances in which each test is
applied makes it clear that the restraint at issue here should
be analyzed under the rule of reason. Part III describes the
first step in a rule of reason analysis and explains how
different conceptions of output in the context of sports
programming led to the different outcomes in Laumann and
Kingray.
Part III then describes why the analysis in
6. Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
7. See Kingray, Inc. v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1184
(S.D. Cal. 2002).
8. See Stephen F. Ross, Antitrust Options to Redress Anticompetitive Restraints
and Monopolistic Practices by Professional Sports Leagues, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
133, 144 (2001); Gabriel Feldman, The Puzzling Persistence of the Single-Entity
Argument for Sports Leagues: American Needle and the Supreme Court’s Opportunity to
Reject A Flawed Defense, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 835, 888 (2009).

LISOVICZ_PROTECTING HOME.DOCX

206

6/2/2014 4:59 PM

Seton Hall Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law

[Vol. 24

Laumann is the sounder approach. Part IV walks through
the final two steps of the rule of reason and acknowledges
that, while MLB’s broadcasting plan harms competition in the
market for live video presentations of professional baseball
games, whether it violates the Sherman Act will hinge on
MLB’s ability to provide procompetitive justifications for its
conduct.
Part V concludes that MLB’s broadcasting
distribution model will survive antitrust scrutiny if the court
finds that that the league’s justifications are legitimate; if the
justifications are not legally cognizable, the model will be
declared unlawful.
I. MLB’S BROADCASTING PLAN
A. Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption
Before examining the details of MLB’s broadcasting model,
brief mention should be made of the league’s historic antitrust
exemption, which theoretically could be asserted as a defense
to any antitrust lawsuit brought against it.9 In 1922, the
Supreme Court held that Baseball was exempt from the
antitrust laws because “exhibitions of base ball . . . are purely
state affairs” and therefore not interstate commerce subject to
regulation under the Sherman Act.10 Despite acknowledging
the serious flaws of this holding in the famous Flood v. Kuhn
decision, the Court nevertheless upheld the exemption,
declaring that it was the role of Congress—and not the
Court—to undo it.11 Thus, even if MLB’s broadcast policy
represents a flagrant violation of antitrust laws, it is possible
that the league could escape liability by invoking its historic
exemption.
9. See John Woolfolk, Judge questions San Jose lawsuit against MLB over A’s
move, INSIDE BAY AREA (Oct. 4, 2013, 7:35 AM), http://www.insidebayarea.com/
breaking-news/ci_24239070/mlb-seeks-dismissal-san-jose-lawsuit-over-move.
10. Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Base Ball Clubs, 259
U.S. 200, 208 (1922).
11. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 285 (1972). Since the Flood decision, lower courts
visiting the issue have sought to limit the scope of the exemption, with one court
holding that it does not apply to radio broadcasts. Henderson Broad. Corp. v. Houston
Sports Ass’n, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 109 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (finding that an exclusive
agreement between a MLB club and a radio station was not immune to antitrust
challenge because the restraint affected competition in the broadcasting industry, not
the baseball industry). But see Nathaniel Grow, In Defense of Baseball’s Antitrust
Exemption, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 211, 268 (2012).
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This Comment does not consider the relevance of this
exemption to the Laumann litigation for two reasons. First,
the legal foundation for the exemption is severely outdated,12
and it seems likely that, should the Court revisit the issue, it
would find that Baseball’s conduct is covered under the
antitrust laws. Second, and relatedly, MLB prefers to avoid
invoking the exemption—probably out of fear that doing so
will cause a court to revoke it.13 Tellingly, the defendants in
Laumann did not even bother to raise this defense.14 Thus,
other than briefly mentioning it here, this Comment does not
concern itself with Baseball’s antitrust exemption.
B. The Sherman Act
In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Act (the “Act”),15
based on the idea that the “unrestrained interaction of
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our
economic resources, the lowest prices, [and] the highest
quality and greatest material progress.”16 Often referred to as
Congress’ “consumer welfare prescription,” 17 the purpose of
the Sherman Act is to provide protection against various
categories of harmful economic conduct and preserve “free
and unfettered competition” in the marketplace.18 Section 1 of
the Act focuses on concerted action—i.e., collusion—among
competitors. Although Section 1 condemns “[e]very contract,
combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade,”19 it is not
interpreted literally.20
Because almost every business
contract restrains trade in some way, Section 1 is construed to

12. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 286 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
13. Samuel G. Mann, In Name Only: How Major League Baseball’s Reliance on Its
Antitrust Exemption Is Hurting the Game, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 587, 600 (2012)
(“The clearest indication that MLB’s antitrust exemption is irrelevant is the fact that
MLB often chooses not to assert it. As sports law professor Mitchell Nathanson has
noted, ‘in an ironic effort to prevent the Sherman Act from applying to it, MLB has
voluntarily abided by it.’”).
14. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the
Complaints, Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 907 F. Supp.2d 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(Nos. 12-cv-1817, 12-cv-37024), 2012 WL 3966118.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
16. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S 1, 4 (1958).
17. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979).
18. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 4.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
20. Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc., 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982).
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forbid only unreasonable restraints of trade.21 A restraint is
considered unreasonable if, under the totality of the
circumstances, its anticompetitive effects outweigh its
procompetitive effects (in antitrust parlance, such restraints
are called “net anticompetitive”).22 Section 2 prohibits any
conduct, concerted or independent, that monopolizes or
threatens monopolization.23
Antitrust enforcement has traditionally been more
concerned with concerted action under Section 1 than with
monopolization under Section 2.24
This is because the
ordinary workings of the marketplace are more easily
disturbed by collaboration between independent economic
actors to suppress competition than by a single firm’s
attempts at monopolization.25 The two elements of a Section 1
claim are: (1) concerted action; and (2) anticompetitive
harm.26 Although the concept of anticompetitive harm eludes
precise definition, courts have noted that “antitrust claims are
concerned not with wrongs directed against the private
interest of an individual business but with conduct that stifles
competition.”27
In other words, a restraint presents
anticompetitive harm when it injures competition, not when it
merely injures a competitor. 28 Thus, a successful challenge to
MLB’s blackout policy must prove not only that the 30 MLB
clubs acted together to restrain trade, but also that the net
effect of this activity was to injure competition in a relevant
market.
21. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993) (“§ 1 of the
Sherman Act has long been interpreted to prohibit only those contracts or combinations
that are ‘unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions.’”); Am. Needle, Inc., v. Nat’l
Football League, 130 S.Ct. 2201, 2208 (2010) (“[E]ven though, ‘read literally,’ § 1 would
address ‘the entire body of private contract,’ that is not what the statute means.”).
22. Feldman, supra note 8, at 840.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 2; see also United States v. E.I. du Pont Nemours & Co., 351 U.S.
377, 391 (1956) (defining monopoly power as “the power to control prices or exclude
competition.”).
24. See Am. Needle, 130 S.Ct. at 2208 (“[I]n § 1 Congress ‘treated concerted
behavior more strictly than unilateral behavior.’”).
25. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
26. WILLIAM C. HOLMES & MELISSA H. MANGIARACINA, ANTITRUST LAW
HANDBOOK § 2:3 (2011-2012 ed. 2011).
27. E. Food Services, Inc. v. Pontifical Catholic Univ. Servs. Ass’n, Inc., 357 F.3d
1,4 (1st Cir. 2004).
28. Brunswick Corp., v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (“[T]he
antitrust laws were enacted for the ‘protection of competition . . . not competitors.’”)
(quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).
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C. Business Structure of Professional Sports Leagues
Antitrust challenges to the business of professional sports
present a difficulty for courts because questions that are often
easily addressed in the context of conventional industries are
complicated by the interplay of common and adverse interests
that define professional sports leagues. Whereas in most
industries firms’ decision-making processes are guided
entirely by the goal of maximizing profits at the expense of
competitors,29 professional sports franchises must act not only
in their individual self-interest but also in the best interests
of the league as a whole.30 The necessity of coordination
regarding the scheduling of games and league wide
sponsorships, among other things, complicates the question of
whether cooperation between clubs amounts to collusion
between competitors.31
The Major League Constitution describes the rules that
govern the relationship between MLB and its clubs.32 This
contractual agreement provides that league decision-making
authority is vested in a governing body comprised of
representatives from each team.33 With the exception of the
Commissioner, who is chosen by the owners and appointed
with limited powers such as overseeing the best interests of
the game, the league is controlled entirely by the clubs and
their owners.34 Appearances notwithstanding, “[c]lub owners
do not take their orders from executives at some separate
organization called ‘Major League Baseball’ . . . they are the
league, constituting the governing board and setting league
policy.”35 This organizational structure puts club owners in
29. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusive Joint Ventures and Antitrust
Policy, 1995 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 53-54 (1995).
30. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 743 (7th Cir.
2008), rev’d, 130 S.Ct. 2201 (2010) (“NFL teams share a vital economic interest in
collectively promoting NFL football. After all, the league competes with other forms of
entertainment for an audience of finite (if extremely large) size, and the loss of audience
members to alternative forms of entertainment necessarily impacts the individual
teams’ success.”).
31. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 102-03 (1984).
32. See Major League Constitution, http://bizofbaseball.com/docs/MLConsititution
June2005Update.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2013).
33. See PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW: TEXT, CASES,
PROBLEMS 537 (3d ed. 2004).
34. Id.
35. Ross, supra note 8, at 139.

LISOVICZ_PROTECTING HOME.DOCX

210

6/2/2014 4:59 PM

Seton Hall Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law

[Vol. 24

the position of having to compete directly against their
partners in a joint business venture.36 Instead of focusing
solely on their own profitability, clubs have a significant
interest in seeing their competitors succeed, which is
necessary to ensure the success of the league as a whole.37
Although clubs compete vigorously on the field of play and vie
for fans and sponsorships, cooperation and restraints on
competition in some aspects of business are essential to a
league’s survival.38 Truly “free and unfettered competition,”39
the hallmark of an ideal marketplace, is simply not possible
in the sports industry. The question confronting courts
concerns how much freedom clubs should have to impose
restrictions on competition that would, in other industries,
amount to collusion. Although in American Needle v. Nat’l
Football League the Supreme Court established that clubs are
capable of conspiring in most situations, the full effect of this
holding remains to be seen.40
D. Broadcast Restrictions
An obvious example of a necessary league-imposed
restraint on competition is the concept of the exclusive home
territory. Home territories give clubs the exclusive right to
operate a franchise and play home games within a defined
geographic area.41 The Major League Constitution states that
the thirty “Major League Clubs shall have assigned operating
territories within which they have the right and obligation to
play baseball games as the home Club.”42 Although the
implementation of exclusive home territories is a clear
36. See RAY YASSER, SPORTS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (7th ed. 2011); see also
N. Am. Soccer League v. Nat’l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d. Cir. 1982) (noting
that in order to “attract as many people as possible to pay money to attend games
between members and to induce advertisers to sponsor TV broadcasts of such games . . .
some sort of an economic joint venture is essential. No single owner could engage in
professional [sports] for profit without at least one other competing team.”).
37. Feldman, supra note 8, at 840.
38. See Dennis W. Carlton et al., The Control of Externalities in Sports Leagues:
An Analysis of Restrictions in the National Hockey League, 112 J. POL. ECON. S268,
S269 (2004).
39. N. Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1958).
40. See American Needle v. National Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2211
(2010).
41. See Major League Constitution, art. VIII, § 8, http://bizofbaseball.com/docs/
MLConsititutionJune2005 Update.pdf.
42. Id.
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restraint on competition, the necessity of such an
arrangement is obvious. Without territorial restrictions,
clubs could schedule home games in any location without
regard to the effect on other clubs, and there would be nothing
to stop a struggling franchise from moving to a larger market
where it could siphon fans away from an indigenous team.
While home market protections initially provided the
economic protection needed to encourage owners to invest in
fledgling leagues, the advent of television broadcasting
threatened their effectiveness and led to the adoption of
exclusive “home television territories.”43 Article X of the
Major League Constitution states, “each Club shall have, with
respect to each game in which it participates, the right to
authorize the telecast of such game only by means of over-theair, cable and satellite technology, and only within its home
television territory.”44 Thus, just as each club agrees not to
play games in another club’s home territory, each club agrees
not to distribute live broadcasts of its games outside its local
geographic region. This model ensures that, for example, the
New York Yankees and their RSN partner have the exclusive
right to televise their games within their home territory. In
exchange, the Yankees and their RSN and MVPD partners
agree to refrain from distributing telecasts outside of this
territory, into, say, the home territory of the Philadelphia
Phillies. A broadcast of a game by a local RSN into a club’s
home territory is referred to as an “in-market” broadcast.45
In addition to providing the rules that govern clubs’ local
broadcast rights, Article X provides that the Commissioner
has the authority to negotiate contracts for national
broadcasts on behalf of the clubs.46 While revenue from local
43. Id. at art. VIII, § 9.
44. Id. at art. X, § 3(a).
45. See Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 907 F. Supp.2d 465, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(defining “in-market” games as “games played by the team in whose designated home
territory the subscriber resides.”).
46. See Major League Constitution, art. X, § 4, http://bizofbaseball.com/docs/
MLConsititutionJune2005 Update.pdf (“[T]he Major League Clubs grant to the
Commissioner, acting as their agent . . . the exclusive right to sell on their behalf,
throughout the United States and other territories as chosen by the Commissioner,
exclusive or non-exclusive television and radio or other video or audio media rights
(including the Internet and any other online technology).” Although by the middle of
the twentieth century it had already been established that the right to control
broadcasts of a live sporting event belonged to the clubs participating in the match,
MLB clubs later ceded the right to broadcast their games to a national audience to the
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television contracts belongs to the clubs themselves, revenues
from national television contracts are considered the collective
property of all clubs and divided evenly among them. 47 The
Commissioner has used his authority in this area to make live
video presentations of games available through three different
media: national television broadcasts on over-the-air
networks or cable channels, such as Fox and ESPN;48 a
subscriber-based television package known as “MLB Extra
Innings” carried by many cable and satellite providers; 49 and
a subscriber-based internet package known as MLB.tv.50
Because these broadcasts are available to consumers
throughout the United States—as opposed to only local fans
within a team’s home territory—they are referred to as “outof-market” broadcast packages.51
E. The Blackout Problem
MLB’s broadcasting plan draws the ire of fans because any
in-market game available on a local RSN is automatically
blacked out for purchasers of MLB Extra Innings and
MLB.tv.52 This means that if an out-of-market package
Commissioner. See Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490
(W.D.P.A. 1938); Weiler & Roberts, supra note 33, at 635.
47. Marc Edelman, Why the “Single Entity” Defense Can Never Apply to NFL
Clubs: A Primer on Property Rights Theory in Professional Sports, 18 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 891, 917 (2008).
48. For example, MLB agreed to new national television contracts with Fox, TBS,
and ESPN in 2012. See John Ourand, ESPN Signs New Deal with MLB Through ‘21
Worth
An
Average
of
$700M
Annually,
SPORTS
BUSINESS
DAILY,
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Daily/Issues/ 2012/08/28/Media/MLB-ESPN.aspx
(Aug. 28, 2012); John Ourand, Fox, Turner contribute to $12 billion rights haul for
MLB, SPORTS BUSINESS JOURNAL, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/
2012/09/24/Media/MLB-12B.aspx (Sept. 24, 2012).
49. For instance, the “Extra Innings” package is offered by DIRECTV. See
http://www.directv.com/sports/mlb (last visited Oct. 29, 2012).
50. See MLB.TV, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/subscriptions/index.jsp?&c_id=mlb&
affiliateId=mlb (last visited Oct. 7, 2013).
51. Stephen F. Ross, An Antitrust Analysis of Sports League Contracts with Cable
Networks, 39 EMORY L.J. 463, 475 (“Package sales of broadcast rights are agreements
among individual clubs, who could otherwise sell rights to broadcast their own games,
to forego such independence in order to receive the presumably higher prices that such
packages attract.”).
52. The MLB describes its “Regular Season Local Live Blackout” policy for
MLB.TV as follows:
All live games on MLB.TV and available through MLB.com At Bat are subject
to local blackouts. Such live games will be blacked out in each applicable
Club’s home television territory, regardless of whether that Club is playing at
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subscriber resides within the home television territory of one
of the clubs involved in a game, she will be unable to use the
package to watch the game. For instance, the broadcast of a
game between the Yankees and the Phillies will not be
available to a MLB Extra Innings subscriber if the subscriber
lives within the home television territory of the Yankees or
the Phillies. To watch the game, the fan would have to
purchase a television package that includes either the
Yankees’ or Phillies’ RSN.
This problem can be significantly more inconvenient for
baseball fans with the misfortune of living in a region of the
country designated as the home television territory of more
than one club. For example, Hawaii is considered the home
territory of the San Diego Padres, Oakland Athletics, Los
Angeles Dodgers, Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim, San
Francisco Giants, and Seattle Mariners.53 This means that
any game featuring one of these six teams is blacked on MLB
Extra Innings or MLB.tv in Hawaii. If a fan wants to watch a
game played by one of these teams, he must subscribe to a
MVPD that carries the team’s RSN. The problem is, inmarket games are blacked out regardless of whether a MVPD
that services the area carries the RSN.54 Thus, fans of the
Seattle Mariners or the San Diego Padres living in Hawaii are
unable to watch their favorite team’s games; they cannot
purchase a cable or satellite television package that carries
the clubs’ RSN partners, and the games are blacked out on
MLB Extra Innings and MLB.tv because Hawaii is in the
Mariners’ and Padres’ home television territories.55
home or away. If a game is blacked out in an area, it is not available for live
game viewing. If you are an MLB.TV subscriber and not within either Club’s
home television territory, the applicable game will be available live and as an
archived game as soon as possible after the conclusion of the game. If you are
an MLB.TV subscriber within either Club’s home television territory or an
MLB.TV subscriber in any territory, the applicable game will be available as
an archived game approximately 90 minutes after the conclusion of the game.
In addition, note: These blackout restrictions apply regardless of whether a
Club is home or away and regardless of whether or not a game is televised in a
Club’s home television territory. All live Toronto Blue Jays games are blacked
out throughout the entire country of Canada.
MLB.TV http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/subscriptions/index.jsp?affiliateId=MLBTVREDIR
#blackout (last visited Oct. 23, 2012).
53. Passan, supra note 1.
54. Id.
55. Id. (“In areas where it makes no sense to carry a particular RSN, the fans are
out of luck even if they buy the Extra Innings or MLB.tv packages.”).
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According to a MLB press release touting the grant of a
patent for the technology used to determine the location of a
fan using the MLB.tv package, these restrictions are
necessary because “[a]ll clubs have local TV broadcast
rightsholders, and their contracts specify that fans inside a
defined geographical radius who can view their broadcasts
shall be blacked out from live online viewing.”56 The website
for DirecTV explains the limitations as follows:
In our agreements with sports leagues and associations, we are
restricted from showing events near where a game is played or
broadcast locally . . . . It’s important to understand that blackouts
and game availability are controlled by the leagues, associations,
and networks that purchase the rights to broadcast individual
games. To protect their rights, DIRECTV must enforce the
restrictions mandated by them.57

Given that this arrangement has the effect of reducing the
total number of broadcasts available to fans, it is natural to
wonder why it exists at all. Is it not in MLB’s best interest to
make as many games available on television as possible? The
structure of the vertical distribution channel that transmits
broadcasts from stadiums to fans’ living rooms helps explain
why clubs agree to restrict output in this way.
F. Local Market Distribution: Clubs, RSNs, and MVPDs
Although local markets for sports television programming
can take a variety of shapes, the first level of the distribution
channel for sports programming always consists of the
upstream vertical relationship between clubs and RSNs.58 At
this level, clubs sell the exclusive right to broadcast their
games to a RSN.59 Because RSN programming is among the

56. Mark Newman, MLB.TV granted landmark U.S. patent, MLB.COM, (May 14,
2009, 11:00 AM), http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20090514&content_id=
4724126&vkey=news_ mlb&fext=.jsp&c_id=mlb.
57. Why was a nationally televised game not shown in my area? DIRECTV,
http://support.directv.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/32/kw/blackouts (last visited Oct. 29,
2012).
58. See Yankees Entm’t and Sports Network, LLC v. Cablevision Sys. Co., 224 F.
Supp. 2d 657, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Diana Moss, Regional Sports Networks, Competition,
and the Consumer, 21 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 56, 60 (2008).
59. Yankees, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 663 (describing this level as “the sale by the
owners/creators of sporting events of their rights to televise to owners of Programming
Networks.”).
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most valuable programming on television,60 bidding between
RSNs competing in the same market is often intense.61 In
recent years RSNs have shelled out increasingly exorbitant
sums for these exclusive rights.62 For instance, the recently
launched Time Warner Cable SportsNet reportedly agreed to
pay the Los Angeles Lakers $3 billion for the exclusive right
to broadcast Lakers’ games for the next 20 years.63
The second level of the distribution channel consists of the
sale of RSN programming to MVPDs.64 MVPDs are television
providers that offer programming to subscribers for a fee.65
MVPD platforms include: cable operators, such as Comcast
and Time Warner Cable; national satellite providers, such as
DirecTV and Dish Network; and large telephone companies,
such as VerizonFiOS and AT&T.66 Because the exclusive
right to broadcast a club’s games is extremely valuable, RSNs
often demand a premium from MVPDs for the right to carry
their channels.67 For instance, Time Warner Cable reportedly
60. See Brian Stelter, Rising TV Fees Mean All Viewers Pay to Keep Sports Fans
Happy,
NY
TIMES
(Jan.
25,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/26/
business/media/all-viewers-pay-to-keep-tv-sports-fans-happy.html?_r=0.
One reason
the value of sports programming has skyrocketed in recent years is that its fan base
provides a guaranteed live audience that cannot use digital video recording technology
to avoid commercial advertising. See Michael Heistand, MLB, FOX and Turner finally
make TV deals official, USA TODAY (Oct. 2, 2012, 12:31 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/
story/gameon/2012/10/02/mlb-turner-sports-tbs-espn-fox/1608173/ (noting that despite a
trend in which “consumers steadily move toward watching TV on an on-demand basis,”
live sports remain “relatively immune to being watched on a taped basis.”).
61. Moss, supra note 58, at 57 (“Competition between RSNs in bidding for team
media rights . . . is often quite fierce.”).
62. See Stelter, supra note 60.
63. Tom Hoffarth, Laker-centric Time Warner Cable channels launch Monday, but
so far distribution is limited, DAILY NEWS LOS ANGELES (Sept. 28, 2012, 8:45 AM),
http://www.dailynews.com/ci_21650164/laker-centric-time-warner-cable-channelslaunch-monday?source=most_viewed.
64. Yankees, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 663 (describing this level as “the purchase and
sale of programming of local professional sporting events” between “Programming
Networks and various MVPDs, such as cable operators, for delivery to their
subscribers.”).
65. Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, “the term ‘multichannel video
programming distributor’ means a person such as, but not limited to, a cable operator, a
multichannel multipoint distribution service, a direct broadcast satellite service, or a
television receive-only satellite program distributor, who makes available for purchase,
by subscribers or customers, multiple channels of video programming.” 47 U.S.C. §
522(13) (2013); see also Yankees, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 662 (describing a MVPD as a
television operator that “provides pay television programming within its service area.”).
66. See
Video
Competition,
NAT’L
CABLE
&
TELECOMM.
ASS’N,
http://www.ncta.com/IssueBriefs/VideoCompetition.aspx (last visited Oct. 29, 2012).
67. See Moss, supra note 58, at 57 (“RSN programming . . . is a unique product, of
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demanded $3.95 per month per subscriber from MVPDs for
the right to carry the new Time Warner Cable SportsNet
channel.68 Unsurprisingly, negotiations between RSNs and
MVPDs for the rights to carry RSN programming can be quite
contentious.69
The final level of the distribution channel consists of the
downstream purchase of MVPD services (i.e., cable or satellite
television subscriptions) by baseball fans and other
consumers.70 After deciding on a cable or satellite provider,
consumers typically choose between different subscription
packages that offer various levels of sports programming. 71
Avid fans of a particular league may supplement an ordinary
sports television package with the purchase of an out-ofmarket product such as MLB Extra Innings.
The structure of the sports programming market shows
that the agreements among clubs not to compete in each
other’s home television territories are enforced through
downstream contractual agreements between clubs, RSNs,
and MVPDs.72 That the horizontal agreement to restrict the
distribution of broadcasts is enforced through vertical
blackout agreements complicates the antitrust analysis.
However, if consumers can prove that they suffered an
antitrust injury as a result of reduced output or artificially
tremendous value to a certain segment of consumers, and thus access to it is crucial to
cable and satellite providers’ ability to remain competitive.”) (quoting Time
Warner/Comcast/Adelphia, Statement of Commissioners Jon Leibowitz and Pamela
Jones Harbour (Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part), January 31, 2006, File No.
051-0151, available at http:// www.ftc.gov/os/closings/ftc/0510151twadelphialeibowitz_
harbour.pdf).
68. Hoffarth, supra note 63.
69. See Moss, supra note 58, at 57; Joe Flint, Time Warner Cable ready to play
hardball over Dodger channel, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Jan. 22, 2014, 11:41 AM)
http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/la-et-ct-dodgers-sportsnet-timewarner-cable-20140122,0,7610460.story#axzz2rcPb3Jx4.
70. Yankees, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 663 (noting that “distribution of multi-channel
programming . . . involves the purchase and sale of pay television services between
competing MVPDs and the residents and business in their respective service areas.”).
71. See Moss, supra note 58, at 58 (noting that RSNs are offered to subscribers “in
the form of sports channels and other premium sports packages.”).
72. One such downstream agreement was analyzed in Kingray—discussed infra
Part III—when blackout language in the NBA’s contract with DirecTV provided that
“DirecTV is to refrain from distributing within the home market of an NBA team any
game that has already been licensed to a local telecaster or cablecaster for telecast
within the team’s home market, except where DirecTV has been authorized to televise
the game as part of DirecTV’s carriage of a regional sports network.” Kingray, Inc. v.
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1193 (S.D. Cal. 2002).
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high prices, then they likely have standing to challenge
Baseball’s policy.73
II. THE APPROPRIATE LEGAL TEST
A. Three Tests of Reasonableness
Over time, courts have developed three tests for
evaluating the reasonableness of a challenged restraint on
trade: (1) the per se rule; (2) the quick look; and (3) the rule of
reason.74 The range of different tests creates a “continuum,
on which the ‘amount and range of information needed’ to
evaluate a restraint varies depending on how ‘highly
suspicious’ and how ‘unique’ the restraint is.”75 While the
ultimate issue addressed is always whether the challenged
conduct is unreasonable, these tests give courts discretion
when allocating burdens of proof and enable courts to tailor
the level of scrutiny applied to a restraint according to the
level harm it presents to competition on its face.76
Due to the complicated structure of the sports
broadcasting market, which involves both horizontal and
vertical restraints, arguments can be made for evaluating
MLB’s blackout policy under each of the three tests.
B. Per Se Rule
The per se rule applies when a challenged restraint
presents obvious competitive harm and lacks “any redeeming

73. A legally cognizable “antitrust injury” is defined as an “injury of the type the
antitrust laws were intended to prevent.” Brunswick Corp., v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.
429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). The substance of this requirement is that the defendant’s
conduct must result in harm to competition itself as opposed to merely harm to a
competitor. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962). In other
words, conduct will not be deemed to have caused antitrust injury merely because it
causes a competitor to lose profits or consumers to pay higher prices—the lost profits or
higher prices must be the result of “a competition-reducing aspect or effect of the
defendant’s behavior.” Atl. Richfield Co., v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 344
(1990).
74. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668-69 (3d Cir. 1993).
75. Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 277 F. 3d 499, 509 (4th Cir. 2002).
76. ANDREW I. GAVIL, ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS
AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 186 (2d ed. 2008) (noting that the quick look
test, like the per se rule, “can be understood in evidentiary terms as a burden-shifting
device.”).
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virtue” or legitimate purpose in the marketplace.77 In the
interest of judicial efficiency, courts will strike down practices
that fit into this category without engaging in an inquiry into
the restraint’s reasonableness.78 Although in earlier periods
the per se rule was applied to a wide range of anticompetitive
practices,79 modern economics and changing understandings
of the purpose of antitrust law have limited its application to
“naked”80 restraints, such as horizontal price-fixing
agreements between competitors.81 Because such conduct is
“so plainly anticompetitive,”82 courts can refuse to consider
any potential justifications offered by a defendant and simply
declare the practice “illegal per se.”83
Despite how rarely the per se test is applied today, one can
argue that it should be applied to MLB’s conduct because its
television plan is implemented through a “horizontal market
allocation” among clubs. A horizontal market allocation is an
agreement among competitors not to compete in certain
geographic areas.84
Because such agreements preclude
competition entirely, they have the potential to be even more
harmful than horizontal price-fixing agreements, which at
least allow competitors to compete on the basis of qualities
77. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S 1, 5 (1958).
78. Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 829 (3rd Cir. 2010)
(“Some categories of restraints, such as horizontal price-fixing and market allocation
agreements among competitors, ‘because of their pernicious effect on competition and
lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable.’”).
79. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Per Se and Rule of Reason
Approaches to Antitrust Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 685, 693 (1991) (explaining that by
the 1960s the Supreme Court “had applied the per se rule to tying arrangements,
horizontal territorial or customer allocations . . . group boycotts . . . and nonprice
vertical restrictions imposed by a supplier on its distributors.”).
80. Naked restraints are restraints with “no purpose except stifling of
competition.” They may be contrasted with “ancillary” restraints, which are restraints
that are a necessary part of a larger agreement that serves some purpose other than
merely restraining trade. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys. 441 U.S. 1, 20
(1979); see also United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel, 85 F. 271, 282 (1898).
81. Horizontal price-fixing occurs when “direct or potential competitors at the
same level of the market structure agree upon the prices that they will charge
customers or pay suppliers. HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 26, at § 2:2; see also
GAVIL, supra note 76, at 352.
82. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 7 n.3 (2006).
83. HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 26, at § 2:8.
84. See WILLIAM C. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW § 5:5
(2013) (defining a horizontal market allocation as “an agreement among existing or
potential direct competitors to divide or otherwise restrict territories, output,
customers, or product or service markets among themselves.”).
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other than price.85
For this reason, horizontal market
allocations are highly suspicious and have traditionally been
considered illegal per se.
One of the best-known examples of a court applying the
per se rule to a horizontal market allocation comes from
United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.86 There, 25 small
grocery store chains formed a cooperative association to
market a line of groceries under the brand name “Topco,” with
each member being assigned a de facto exclusive territory.87
Despite the fact that the members collectively possessed only
a small market share, the Supreme Court issued a broad
condemnation of horizontal agreements between competitors,
declaring that the “restraint in this case is a horizontal one,
and therefore, a per se violation of Sec. 1.”88 Although
Baseball’s home territory arrangement shares the key
features of the agreement in Topco, a court would likely
distinguish the two cases. The industry at issue in Topco has
none of the special features that characterize professional
sports, and many commentators agree that Topco would not
likely be decided the same way under modern economic
theory.89
Ironically, perhaps the best argument for applying the per
se rule is that some sports franchises have argued this is the
appropriate test. In a 2008 challenge to a newly adopted
National Hockey League (“NHL”) rule forcing clubs to devote
a portion of their websites to league activities, the New York
Rangers asserted that agreements to “ban out-of-market
broadcasting of a team’s games” were “specific horizontal
agreements . . . that severely restrict individual team
competition, and consumer choice, in areas such as
broadcasting.”90
Similarly, in a 2009 bankruptcy court
adversary proceeding brought by the Phoenix Coyotes against
the NHL, the Coyotes argued, “[t]he NHL and its members
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

GAVIL, supra note 76, at 128.
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
Id.
Id. at 608.
See e.g., Charles F. Rule, The Administration’s Views on Joint Ventures, 54
ANTITRUST L.J. 1121, 1123 (1985) (concluding that Topco would not be decided the
same way under more recent antitrust law).
90. Plaintiffs’ Motion in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Madison
Square Garden, L.P. v. Nat’l Hockey League, 2007 WL 3254421 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d,
270 F. App’x 56 (2d Cir. 2008). NHL Center Ice is the NHL’s out-of-market internet
package.
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have conspired to create exclusive television and radio
broadcast rights within designated territories through
contracts within individual NHL members, thereby
maintaining monopoly power within each team’s ‘home
territory’ by preventing others from broadcasting events
within those territories.”91
Despite the Rangers’ and Coyotes’ arguments, courts are
unlikely to apply the per se rule because restraints in the
sports industry are simply not suited for evaluation under the
per se rule. Since the Supreme Court’s decision in National
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents of the University
of Oklahoma,92 discussed infra, courts have consistently
refused to apply the per se rule to disputes involving
professional sports leagues, holding that the per se rule is
inappropriate in an industry where cooperation among
competitors is necessary. For instance, when the Oakland
Raiders challenged the NFL’s exclusive home territory
provision in an attempt to move the club to Los Angeles in the
1980s, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that, although the
rule “divides markets among the 28 teams, a practice
presumed illegal . . . the unique structure of the NFL
precludes application of the per se rule.”93
Thus, it highly unlikely that a court would review the
legality of MLB’s blackout policy under the per se rule. The
question of whether the “quick look” or the “rule of reason”
should be applied is a closer call.
C. Rule of Reason
On the opposite end of the continuum from the per se test
is the rule of reason, which is applied when a restraint’s effect
on competition is not obvious.94 In a rule of reason analysis, a
court must look at the totality of the circumstances, which
91. Second Amended Complaint, In re Dewey Ranch Hockey, LLC, 414 B.R. 577
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009) (Nos. 09-bk-09488, 09-bk-09500, 09-bk-09491, 09-bk-09495, 2:09bk-09488, 2:09-ap-494-RTBP), 2009 WL 1569963.
92. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S.
85, 117 (1984).
93. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1392
(9th Cir. 1984).
94. See Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 277 F. 3d 499, 509 (4th Cir.
2002) (explaining that the rule of reason is applied to “restraints whose net impact on
competition is particularly difficult to determine.”).
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may include detailed economic analyses of market power,95 in
order to determine whether the challenged conduct amounts
to an unreasonable restraint of trade. 96 In the often-cited
language of Justice Brandeis, courts consider factors such as
“the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is
applied . . . the nature of the restraint and its effect . . . [t]he
history of the restraint,” and “the purpose or end sought to be
attained.”97
A rule of reason analysis consists of three stages.98 First,
the plaintiff must show that the restraint presents
anticompetitive harm.99 As discussed supra Part I, a properly
pleaded complaint must allege that the defendant’s conduct is
harmful to competition as a whole in a relevant market, not
that that it merely has an adverse effect on competitors or
consumers.100
A plaintiff may be able to demonstrate
anticompetitive harm through the use of direct evidence, such
as reduced output, higher prices, or reduced consumer choice,
or through circumstantial evidence, such as a detailed
economic industry analysis consisting of a relevant product
market and proof of market power.101 If the plaintiff meets its
95. Market power is the ability to control prices. See Ball Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Mut.
Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1335 (7th Cir. 1986) (defining market power as “the
ability to cut back the market’s total output and so raise price.”).
96. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that
under the rule of reason a court must look at “all of the circumstances of a case in
deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an
unreasonable restraint on competition.”) (internal quotations omitted).
97. Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
98. See K.M.B Warehouse Distribs., Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 127 (2d
Cir. 1995) (“Establishing a violation of the rule of reason involves three steps.”); James
T. McKeown, The Economics of Competitive Balance: Sports Antitrust Claims after
American Needle, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 517, 529 (“Courts typically apply a threestep rule of reason analysis.”).
99. McKeown, supra note 98, at 529 (“First, the plaintiff must show an
anticompetitive effect.”).
100. See E&L Consulting, Ltd. v. Doman Indus., Ltd., 472 F.3d 23, 31 (2d Cir. 2006)
(affirming dismissal of a complaint because it “simply does not allege . . . ‘that the
challenged action has had an actual adverse effect on competition as a whole in the
relevant market.’”).
101. See GAVIL, supra note 76, at 186 (“Circumstantial evidence . . . would consist of
market definition, a calculation of market shares, and an inference from high market
shares that the defendants had the capacity to harm competition, i.e., market power.
Direct evidence . . . [is] evidence of actual anticompetitive effects, of the exercise of
market power, such as reduced output, higher prices, or diminished quality.”); see also
Realcomp II, Ltd. v. F.T.C., 635 F.3d 815, 825 (6th Cir. 2011) (“When restraints are not
per se unlawful, and their net impact on competition not obvious, the conventional ruleof-reason approach requires courts to engage in a thorough analysis of the relevant
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burden of showing that a defendant’s practice has adverse
effects on competition in a relevant market, then the second
step of the rule of reason requires the defendant to offer
procompetitive justifications for its conduct. 102
If the
defendant is able to do so, then the court applies a balancing
test that weighs procompetitive and anticompetitive effects to
determine whether a restraint is net anticompetitive.103
If Baseball’s broadcasting model did not involve exclusive
home television territories, the rule of reason would
undoubtedly be the appropriate test for evaluating the
exclusive vertical distribution agreements between clubs and
RSNs.104 Unlike horizontal agreements between competitors
at the same market level, vertical distribution arrangements
are justified by numerous procompetitive benefits.
For
example, although exclusive vertical distributorships inhibit
“intrabrand”105 competition for a supplier’s products by
granting dealers monopolies in defined geographic areas, they
can also bring about distribution efficiencies by helping to
alleviate the “free rider” effect,106 and by encouraging retailers
to engage in promotional activities that otherwise might not
market and the effects of the restraint in that market.”).
102. See Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 830 (3rd Cir.
2010) (“The plaintiff bears an initial burden under the rule of reason of showing that
the alleged combination or agreement produced adverse, anticompetitive effects within
the relevant product and geographic markets. The plaintiff may satisfy this burden by
proving the existence of actual anticompetitive effects or defendant’s market power. If
a plaintiff meets his initial burden of adducing adequate evidence of market power or
actual anti-competitive effects, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the
challenged conduct promotes a sufficiently pro-competitive objective.” (quoting United
States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993)).
103. See Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“The
true test of illegality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even
destroy competition.”).
104. See HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 26, at § 2:14 (“[V]ertical nonprice
restraints are governed by the far more flexible rule of reason”); see also GAVIL, supra
note 76, at 352 (explaining that vertical restraints are agreements between firms
operating at different levels of a market structure).
105. “Intrabrand” restraints are restraints that “affect competition between sellers
of the same brand—such as rival Chevrolet dealers.” GAVIL, supra note 76, at 352.
They may be contrasted with “interbrand” restraints, which “limit competition between
competing brands, such as Chevrolet and Ford.” Id.; see also Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
106. See McKeown, supra note 98, at 527 (defining free riding as “a form of
externality that exists when the actions of one firm benefit another firm without the
latter firm (the free rider) having to pay for that benefit.”).
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be worthwhile.107 Because vertical restraints present benefits
as well as harms to competition, the rule of reason is applied
as a balancing test: if the benefits outweigh the harms, the
restraint will be upheld; if the harms clearly outweigh the
benefits, the restraint violates Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
D. Quick Look
Finally, over time courts have determined that a full rule
of reason analysis is not needed to assess the legality of every
restraint that is not illegal per se.108 If a business practice has
obvious anticompetitive effects but some procompetitive
justifications, courts may apply an intermediate test known
as the “quick look.”109 Under the quick look test, an economic
industry analysis proving that a restraint is net
anticompetitive is not required, and the burden instead shifts
to the defendant to prove that there are legitimate
procompetitive reasons for imposing the restraint.110
The Supreme Court’s decision in National Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma (“NCAA”) was integral to the development of the
quick look standard.111
There, the challenged conduct
consisted of agreements between the NCAA and its television
partners that imposed limits on the number of college football
games that could be aired each week and on the number of
games each school could televise in a given season.112
Recognizing that they could obtain significantly more
lucrative contracts on their own, a coalition of large
107. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977) (explaining
that exclusive vertical distribution agreements can have the benefit of “induc[ing]
retailers to engage in promotional activities.”).
108. Marc Edelman, Upon Further Review: Will the NFL’s Trademark Licensing
Practices Survive Full Antitrust Scrutiny? The Remand of American Needle v. Nat’l
Football League, 16 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 183, 198 (2011) (“In the middle of the
spectrum, where an arrangement seems less nefarious, a court may instead apply the
‘quick look’ test (sometimes also referred to as an ‘abbreviated’ Rule of Reason test).”).
109. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993) (describing the
quick look test as “an intermediate standard.”).
110. Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. Nat’l Hockey League, 2007 WL 3254421 at *6
(S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 270 F. App’x 56 (2d Cir. 2008) (“A truncated rule of reason
analysis, a ‘quick look,’ would indeed relieve the Plaintiff of its initial burden of
identifying a relevant market and showing an actual adverse effect on competition.”).
111.
See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85 (1984).
112. Id. at 92.
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universities with successful football programs brought an
antitrust action against the NCAA under Section 1.
After the plaintiffs provided convincing proof that the
NCAA’s plan reduced output, made broadcasts unresponsive
to consumer preferences, and essentially fixed the prices of
network bids, the Supreme Court determined that no detailed
industry analysis was needed to determine that the restraint
was net anticompetitive.113 At the same time, the Court was
not ready to declare the restraint per se illegal because it
recognized that college football is an industry in which
“horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the
product is to be available at all.”114 Because neither the per se
rule nor the rule of reason was appropriate for evaluating the
restraint, the Court presumed the restraint was unreasonable
but gave the NCAA the opportunity to rebut this presumption
by offering procompetitive justifications.115
In so doing, the Court planted the seed for an intermediate
standard to be applied in situations where a defendant could
have a legitimate reason for engaging in conduct that appears
unreasonable on its face. In the end, the Court rejected the
NCAA’s contentions that the plan was needed to protect live
attendance at games and to maintain competitive balance,
and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs without requiring them to
provide detailed economic proofs that the plan was net
anticompetitive under the rule of reason.116
Given the slight probability of a court applying the per se
test to a restraint in the professional sports industry, a
plaintiff’s best shot at proving MLB’s broadcasting plan is
illegal is to argue that the league’s conduct falls into the quick
look category. If a court can be convinced that “an observer
with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could
conclude that the [blackout policy] would have an
anticompetitive effect on customers and markets,” then it will

113. Id. at 108.
114. Id. at 101.
115. Id. at 117-119 (rejecting the NCAA’s proposed justifications). See also GAVIL,
supra note 76, at 186 (“[T]he ‘quick look’ can be understood in evidentiary terms as a
burden-shifting device: evidence of actual harm to competition gives rise to a
presumption that the challenged conduct was an unreasonable restraint of trade and
shifts the burden of production to the defendant to offer evidence that the conduct can
otherwise be justified.”).
116. NCAA, 468 U.S at 108.
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apply the quick look.117 The quick look saves the plaintiff
from having to prevail in litigation under the rule of reason,
which is often extremely expensive and rarely successful.118
E. The Rule of Reason is the Appropriate Standard
Should the court in Laumann apply the quick look or the
rule of reason? As discussed, the court will apply the rule of
reason unless it determines that MLB’s blackout plan is “so
plainly anticompetitive” that it requires “only a cursory
examination” to determine its illegality.119 Unfortunately for
the plaintiffs, the presumption that the rule of reason applies
to most restraints,120 especially those in the sports industry,
will likely carry the day. It is unlikely that the plaintiffs will
be able to provide conclusive proof that MLB’s broadcasting
plan is net anticompetitive in the absence of a detailed
economic study to that effect.
Furthermore, even if the court concluded that “no
elaborate industry analysis”121 was needed to show the
broadcasting plan leads to higher prices and reduced output,
MLB would have the opportunity to prove that there are
procompetitive justifications for its conduct.122 As long as
MLB is able to produce some evidence of procompetitive
effects, such as proof that the restrictions enhance the
“character and quality of the product,”123 a court must weigh
these considerations under a full-blown rule of reason
analysis.124
117. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999).
118. See Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st
Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 830 (2009).
119. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 7 n.3 (2006).
120. See id. at 5 (“[T]his Court presumptively applies rule of reason analysis.”).
121. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 US 679, 692 (1978).
122. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 104 (“Whether the ultimate finding is the product of a presumption or actual
market analysis, the essential inquiry remains the same—whether or not the
challenged restraint enhances competition.”).
123. See id. at 102.
124. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993) (“If the
defendant offers sound procompetitive justifications, . . . the court must proceed to
weigh the overall reasonableness of the restraint using a full-scale rule of reason
analysis.”). Furthermore, the summary judgment determination in Laumann provides
no reason to doubt that the case will ultimately be decided under the rule of reason. In
denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss, Judge Scheindlin cited American Needle for
the proposition that “‘[w]hen restraints on competition are essential if the product is to
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III. RULE OF REASON: STEP ONE
A. Reduced Output and Anticompetitive Harm
As discussed supra Part II, the rule of reason evaluates
whether a restraint is net anticompetitive by weighing the
harm it presents to competition against the benefits it
provides to consumers.125 The first stage in the three-step
rule of reason analysis requires the plaintiff to allege that the
challenged restraint has resulted in harm to competition.126
Reduced output is one of the most commonly recognized forms
of anticompetitive harm.127 Output restrictions brought about
by anything other than natural market forces harm
competition by raising prices and impairing competitors’
ability to compete on the merits.128
NCAA makes it clear that whether a broadcast plan
artificially reduces output is a pivotal consideration in
determining whether it violates the Sherman Act.129 There,
be available at all,’ per se rules of illegality are inapplicable, and instead the restraint
must be judged according to the flexible Rule of Reason.” Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey
League, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l
Football League, 130 S.Ct. 2201, 2216 (2010) (quoting NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101)). The
court also relied on the holding in Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. v. Salvino,
Inc., 542 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2008) that “agreements by individual clubs to grant the
League the exclusive right to license use of certain rights originally held by the
individual clubs are analyzed under the rule of reason.” Laumann, 907 F. Supp. 2d at
490.
125. See id. at 485-87 (framing the issue before the court as whether the “multilevel conspiracy consisting of horizontal and vertical agreements implicating the
League defendants, the RSNs and the MVPDs” has an “anticompetitive effect that [is]
harmful to the consumer” or whether it “‘stimulates competition . . . in the consumer’s
best interest.’”).
126. McKeown, supra note 98, at 529 (“First, the plaintiff must show an
anticompetitive effect.”).
127. See Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic, Intern., Inc. 626 F.3d 1327, 1339 (11th Cir. 2010)
(“Actual anticompetitive effects include, but are not limited to, reduction of output,
increase in price, or deterioration in quality.”).
128. See Gen. Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat’l Truck Leasing Ass’n, 744 F.2d 588, 594-95
(7th Cir. 1984) (“An agreement on output also equates to a price-fixing arrangement. If
firms raise price, the market’s demand for their product will fall, so the amount
supplied will fall too—in other words, output will be restricted. If instead the firms
restrict output directly, price will as mentioned rise in in order to limit demand to the
reduced supply. Thus . . . raising price, reducing output, and dividing markets have the
same anticompetitive effects.”).
129. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S.
85, 106 (“[R]estrictions on price and output are the paradigmatic examples of restraints
of trade that the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit.”).
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the NCAA’s plan was held to be anticompetitive because
“[p]rice is higher and output lower than they would otherwise
be.”130 Thus, one test of a broadcasting plan’s legality is
whether it limits output to a level “lower than [it] would
otherwise be” in the absence of the restraint.131 This test was
relatively easy to apply in NCAA because the plan at issue
there prevented schools from selling broadcast rights to all
but three networks and capped the number of television
appearances each school could make in a given year. 132
However, Kingray and Laumann reveal that the application
of this test is not always so straightforward. These cases
show that different notions of how to measure output in the
context of the sports broadcasting industry can lead to vastly
different outcomes.
B. The Kingray Approach to Output
In Kingray, the plaintiffs alleged that the NBA and
DirecTV conspired to restrict output and raise prices by
making NBA League Pass available exclusively through
DirecTV and blacking out games available on local RSNs. 133
NBA League Pass is a subscriber-based television package
that allows purchasers to watch all out-of-market games
subject to blackouts of in-market games that would otherwise
be available.134 Essentially, it is the NBA’s version of MLB
Extra Innings. The Kingray plaintiffs alleged four theories of
anticompetitive harm, including a claim for conspiracy to
limit output.135
130. Id.
131. See Ross, supra note 51, at 476 (“The fatal flaw in the NCAA plan, according to
the Supreme Court, was that output was ‘lower than [it] would otherwise be.’ The key
issue, therefore, is whether viewership is lower because of the challenged contract than
it would be if that contract were enjoined.”); see also Ethan Flatt, Solidifying the
Defensive Line: The NFL Network’s Current Position Under Antitrust Law and How It
Can Be Improved, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 637, 659-60 (2009) (defining output in
terms of consumer welfare and stating that “consumer welfare can be said to increase
when consumers (or viewers) have greater access to the television broadcasts.”).
132. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 106.
133. Kingray, Inc. v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1184 (S.D.
Cal. 2002).
134. Id.
135. See Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Sherman Act, Clayton Act,
and California Business & Professions Code and Demand for Jury Trial, Kingray, Inc.
v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1184 (S.D. Cal. 2002) (No. 00 CV
1545 JM), 2001 WL 34674898.
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The court dismissed all four claims, holding that the
plaintiffs failed to allege anticompetitive harm. Addressing
the reduced output theory, Judge Lorenz found that blackouts
did not bring about a reduction in output because every time
a blackout is enforced on a certain channel, it still available
on another channel.136 Because of this, the court held that
“NBA League Pass’s black-out provision does not restrict
output; it only affects what channel the game is available
on.”137 Distinguishing NCAA, the court noted that NBA
League Pass made over one thousand previously unavailable
out-of-market
regular
season
games
accessible
to
138
consumers.
This led the court to conclude that introducing
NBA League Pass actually increased output by making more
games available relative to the status quo ante.139
Accordingly, the challenged restraint passed the NCAA test
because it did not render output lower than it would
otherwise be.
C. The Laumann Approach to Output
Similar to Kingray, the plaintiffs in Laumann alleged that
the broadcasting restraints implemented by MLB and its
television partners violated Section 1 because they resulted in
reduced output and increased prices for consumers.140
However, despite the fact that MLB and the NBA enforce
viewership restrictions through the same kind of agreements
among teams, RSNs, and MVPDs, Judge Scheindlin rejected
Kingray’s holding that anticompetitive harm is not present
when blackouts prevent fans from watching games on certain
channels. Although the court acknowledged that blackouts do
not prevent games from being available to consumers on all
channels, it declared, “[m]aking all games available as part of
a package, while it may increase output overall, does not, as a
matter of law, eliminate the harm to competition wrought by
preventing the individual teams from competing to sell their
136. Kingray, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 1193 (“The NBA DirecTV contract provides that
the only time a game is ‘blacked out’ on the NBA League Pass is because it is otherwise
available to view on a free local over-the-air broadcast or via local and national
channels.”).
137. Id. at 1194.
138. Id. at 1195.
139. Id.
140. Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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games outside their home territories in the first place.”141 In
other words, even if an out-of-market package makes more
games available to consumers relative to the status quo ante,
it may still render output lower than it would be when
compared to a market with no restraints at all. Thus, Judge
Scheindlin held that the plaintiffs adequately alleged that
MLB’s broadcasting arrangement presented anticompetitive
harm in the form of reduced output, allowing the case to
proceed to the second step of the rule of reason analysis.
D. Total Viewership is the Proper Measure of Output
Comparing Kingray and Laumann makes it clear that
Laumann provides the more accurate measure of output and
the better analysis. Kingray fails to apply NCAA correctly
because it defines output solely in terms of the total number
of games available on television.142 The better definition of
output in the sports programming context, as Laumann
implicitly acknowledges, is total viewership.
In finding that NBA League Pass increased output, 143
Kingray simply compared the total number of NBA games
available on television before and after the introduction of
NBA League Pass. The flaw in this approach is that a
broadcasting arrangement that increases output relative to a
previous state of affairs may still significantly restrict output.
Indeed, Judge Lorenz acknowledges that one reason NBA
League Pass increased output is that, “with few specified
exceptions, out-of-market games were not available to the
public” prior to its inception.144 Thus, while NBA League Pass
may have resulted in increased output, the increase was
relative only to the prior, even more restrictive, distribution
arrangement in place.
The Laumann analysis is preferable because it takes a
holistic view of the market as opposed to the narrower beforeand-after approach taken in Kingray.145 The assumption
141. Id. at 490.
142. Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 754 F. Supp. 1336,
1356 (N.D. Ill. 1991), aff’d, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Measuring output simply by
the number of games gives an incomplete picture.”).
143. Kingray, 188 F. Supp.2d at 1195 (“[O]utput of out-of-market NBA games
increased by virtue of the NBA League Pass, rather than decreased.”).
144. Id.
145. See Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)
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underlying the plaintiffs’ position in both cases is that
eliminating territorial restrictions would increase output in
the market for live video presentations of games by giving
clubs the freedom to negotiate television contracts with RSNs,
MVPDs, and internet providers throughout the country.146 As
Professor Stephen Ross explains, “[a]bsent restraints,
individual teams would compete not only on the playing field
and for playing talent, but for television viewers as well. For
example, the Chicago Bulls might be able to market their own
games to stations across the country who would be interested
in featuring performances by superstar Michael Jordan.”147 If
this were the case, fans would have the freedom to subscribe
to the RSN of their choosing regardless of their geographic
location. Increasing the variety of programming options
available to consumers would bring about increased
competition among clubs, RSNs, MVPDs, and internet
providers, which would consequently drive down costs for
consumers.148
In this way, MLB’s broadcasting plan restricts output not
because it limits the total number of games that can be seen
on television, but rather because it limits total viewership. 149
Total viewership is a more accurate measure of output in the
context of sports programming because the total number of
consumers having access to games is a better reflection of
product availability than the total number of games
broadcast.150 Defining output in terms of the number of
(explaining that the legality of a restraint is determined by, among other things, “the
facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied” and “[t]he history of the
restraint.”).
146. STEPHEN F. ROSS & STEFAN SZYMANSKI, FANS OF THE WORLD UNITE! 15 (2008)
(explaining that “[a]bsent the exclusive territorial arrangements agreed to by league
owners, individual teams would either directly, or more likely via intermediaries,
arrange for their own games to be available to out-of-market fans.”).
147. Ross, supra note 51, at 467.
148. See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants Motion to Dismiss or in
the Alternative for Partial Summary Judgment, Madison Square Garden, L.P., v. Nat’l
Hockey League, No. 07 CV 8455, 2008 WL 4547518 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2008), 2008 WL
2825036 (noting that fans “are deprived of alternatives that could be offered by
individual clubs—such as the ability to purchase single games or the games of a single
team—and of the lower prices that would result from such competition.”).
149. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to
Dismiss the Complaints, Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (Nos. 12-cv-1817, 12-cv-3704), 2012 WL 5272352.
150. See Ross, supra note 51, at 478 (“The key issue, therefore, is whether
viewership is lower because of the challenged contract than it would be if that contract
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games broadcast leads to absurd consequences. If this were
the case, leagues could impose any arbitrary limitation on
viewership, and as long as each game was available on some
channel and at some price, there would be no reduction in
output.151 For example, MLB could decide to make broadcasts
available only on a pay-per-view basis for the cost of a ticket
to the ballgame. Even though this kind of plan would cause a
vast majority of fans to forego watching games, under
Kingray’s reasoning, such a restriction “does not restrict
output; it only affects what channel the game is available
on.”152
Appreciating this reality, Laumann acknowledges that
MLB’s plan reduces total viewership by “‘forc[ing] . . .
consumers to forego the purchase of [these games] from other
distributors [the individual clubs]’ resulting in decreased
consumer choice and increased.”153 Thus, the Laumann
plaintiffs stated a claim for anticompetitive harm under step
one of the rule of reason by showing that MLB’s broadcasting
plan uses agreements among economic actors to limit the
total number of fans having access to games.
IV. RULE OF REASON: STEPS TWO AND THREE
Once a plaintiff successfully states a claim for
anticompetitive harm, the next step of the rule of reason
shifts the burden to the defendant, who must come forward
with procompetitive justifications for its conduct. 154 If the
court finds that the defendant’s justifications are legally
cognizable, the final step of the analysis requires the court to
balance competitive effects and to determine whether the
were enjoined.”).
151. Or, as the plaintiffs effectively point out, “It is no more correct to assert . . .
that the only measure of output of sports telecasts is the number of games available
than it is to say that the measure of output of books in the number of titles available.”
Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the
Complaints, Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(Nos. 12-cv-1817, 12-cv-3704), 2012 WL 5272352.
152. Kingray, Inc. v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1194 (S.D.
Cal. 2002).
153. Laumann, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 490 (quoting Brantley v. NBC Universal, Inc.,
675 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2012)).
154. See McKeown, supra note 98, at 539 (“[T]he second step of a rule of reason
analysis . . . requires the defendant to come forward with a procompetitive justification
for the challenged arrangement or restraint.”).
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defendant could feasibly adopt a less restrictive alternative.155
At the balancing stage, a plaintiff will only succeed if it is able
to prove that the restraint’s anticompetitive effects greatly
outweigh its procompetitive benefits, or that a less restrictive
alternative could easily be adopted.156
In practice, courts rarely engage in the balancing of
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects required by the
third stage,157 and plaintiffs almost succeed under the rule of
reason.158 Probably because courts are not accustomed to the
difficult task of sifting through economic analyses of market
power and weighing the harmful and beneficial effects of a
restraint, the overwhelming majority of rule of reason cases
are disposed of at one of the earlier stages.159 In fact,
according to a recent study, only one of the past 222 antitrust
cases to go to a final determination under the rule of reason
was resolved in favor of the plaintiff.160 However, the same
study showed that all but seven of the 222 cases never made
it past step one of the rule of reason because the court found
that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate anticompetitive
harm.161
Thus, the fact that the court found an
anticompetitive effect is undoubtedly a victory for the
plaintiffs, and shows that the outcome of the case will turn on
MLB’s ability to produce procompetitive justifications for its
conduct.
In its defense, MLB will likely assert that home television
territories are needed to promote competitive balance, which
courts have recognized as a legitimate interest in professional
155. Id. at 542 (“The final step in a rule of reason analysis involves weighing the
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects and evaluating whether less restrictive
alternatives would satisfy the legitimate needs.”).
156. See Capital Imaging Associates, P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Associates, Inc.,
996 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1993) (“Assuming defendant comes forward with
[procompetitive justifications] the burden shifts back to plaintiff for it to demonstrate
that any legitimate collaborative objectives proffered by defendant could have been
achieved by less restrictive alternatives.”).
157. Carrier, supra note 118, at 837 (“In the first decade of the twenty-first century,
courts have continued their use of a burden-shifting framework in applying the rule of
reason. They almost never balance.”); see also Edelman, supra note 108, at 203 (noting
that antitrust plaintiffs face “an uphill battle.”).
158. Carrier, supra note 118, at 830.
159. See Daniel C. Fundakowski, The Rule of Reason: From Balancing to Burden
Shifting, 1 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L. CIV. PRAC. PROC. COMMITTEE: PERSPECTIVES IN
ANTITRUST 2-3 (2013).
160. See Carrier, supra note 118, at 830.
161. Id. at 829.

LISOVICZ_PROTECTING HOME.DOCX

2014]

6/2/2014 4:59 PM

Protecting Home

233

sports.162 It will argue that its broadcasting model helps level
the playing field by limiting the disparity in television
revenues earned by small and large market clubs.163 It will
likely argue that giving individual clubs the ability to
broadcast games throughout the country would exacerbate
the existing disparity in television revenues by allowing large
market teams to take an even larger slice of the pie to the
detriment of smaller market teams.164
If MLB can provide economic analyses to support their
justifications, then the court will likely uphold the legality of
the broadcast plan rather than attempting to balance the
benefits of the arrangement against its harms.
If the
defendants can show that the restrictions have the effect of
“making the entire league successful and profitable,” then the
court will likely find that they withstand scrutiny under the
antitrust laws.165
V. CONCLUSION
Although Laumann reached the correct conclusion in
determining that MLB’s broadcasting plan harms competition
in the market for live video presentations of professional
baseball games, whether the plan runs afoul of the antitrust
laws depends on whether a court accepts MLB’s
procompetitive justifications. If the league is unable to
provide proof of the need for these restrictions, then the court
will see no need to go through a full rule of reason analysis
162. Major League Baseball Props. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 331-32 (2d Cir.
2008) (“[C]ompetitive balance among the teams is essential to both the viability of the
Clubs and public interest in the sport . . . .”).
163. Although some of the difference in television revenues is redistributed among
teams through the league’s revenue-sharing policies, the disparity among large and
small market teams is still significant. For instance, taking into account money
distributed through revenue sharing and from national television contracts, the Los
Angeles Angels earned an estimated $119,610,000 in total television revenues in 2013
whereas the Cincinnati Reds earned only $44,000,000. Without revenue sharing
policies in place, the Angles would have earned $123,150,000 in local television
revenues while the Reds would have earned only $10,000,000. See Dave Warner, How
MLB Splits Your TV Dollars, AWFUL ANNOUNCING (May 17, 2013),
http://www.awfulannouncing.com/2013/may/how-mlb-splits-your-tv-dollars.html.
164. Judge Scheindlin hints at other potential justifications, such as that
“‘individual [teams] are inherently unable to compete fully effectively’ or that the
agreements are ‘necessary to maintain a competitive balance.’” Laumann v. Nat’l
Hockey League, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
165. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2206 (2010).
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and will instead apply the quick look test to strike down the
current model.
If MLB can provide legally cognizable
procompetitive justifications, then the rule of reason applies
and the court will almost certainly conclude that dividing the
market for baseball games into exclusive home television
territories and “granting the Leagues exclusive rights to
distribute out-of-market programming . . . [is] reasonable and
in compliance with antitrust law.”166

166.

Laumann, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 490.

